BTC Trek

Bitcoin SpamWhy We CAN Stop It

Bitcoin has a network effect as money because users keep choosing it for the advantages it has over other monies. Pictures, tokens, non-monetary contracts and arbitrary file storage in its blocks can reduce the emergent monetary properties that come from those choices. Spam is neither inevitable nor unstoppable. It results from the choices that protocol rules allow, and different choices and protocol rules can move Bitcoin toward its role as money or away from it. Divergent uses can create non-monetary emergent properties that displace or override some of its monetary ones, so limiting them helps Bitcoin remain money.

Two loops, one lever The same rules can feed either loop. Tap a box to see where the page argues it.
Two feedback loops fed by protocol rules. The monetary loop: people choose Bitcoin as money, the network effect grows, monetary properties strengthen, and more people choose it. The divergent loop: rules make data cheap, non-monetary use grows, non-monetary properties emerge, and those who earn from them resist rule changes, which keeps the rules as they are. favour money Monetary loop People chooseBitcoin as money Network effectgrows Monetary propertiesstrengthen make data cheap resist change Divergent loop Non-monetary usegrows Non-monetary propertiesemerge Earners resistrule changes Protocol ruleswhat's allowed, what data costs

Both loops run on the same rules. Choose a side above to see which loop the rules feed.

Bitcoin is money because people use it as money

No one decreed that Bitcoin is money. It became money the way every money has: people found it useful for trade, more people accepted it because others did, and that network effect fed on itself. Its monetary role is an emergent property. It lasts as long as the qualities that produced it stay intact.

Economists usually list six properties that make something good money. Bitcoin adds a seventh that no earlier money fully offered (gold came closest): immutability through decentralization. Here is each property, and how non-monetary use can affect it.

  1. Durability

    Money has to last. Bitcoin's ledger lasts because many independent people keep and verify it. Data written to the chain stays there permanently visible, and data hidden in unspendable outputs remains stuck in the ledger of coins that every node holds in fast storage. Both add to the long-term cost of keeping the ledger.

  2. Portability

    Money has to move easily, salable across space. The cost of moving Bitcoin is set by multiple markets for transaction space. When non-monetary demand enters that market, the cost of transactions depends not just on the market, but can also be largely affected by anything that degrades monetary properties and increases friction.

  3. Divisibility

    Money has to be usable in small amounts, especially in a digital age. The smallest payment worth making depends on what a transaction costs. When non-monetary demand pushes that cost up, it also raises the smallest amount of bitcoin worth spending. That weakens bitcoin's salability across scales: its ability to serve small, everyday payments as well as large ones.

  4. Fungibility

    Fungibility, also called uniformity, means every unit of money is as good as any other. Transaction outputs can be uniquely marked, or bundled with other outputs, using various mechanisms, so equal amounts stop being equal. Fungibility is also how money scales globally, with salability across space. Units are easy to keep interchangeable within a geographic area, but communities and governments across the globe can act against uniformity.

  5. Scarcity

    Non-monetary use doesn't touch the 21 million cap, to a large degree. That cap is enforced by the nodes that verify every block, so it is only as secure as the seventh property below. Non-monetary use can result in accidental loss of some Bitcoin supply. Over time, non-monetary use, or accidental misuse, can cause unspendable outputs to collect on the blockchain, reducing the overall supply of money.

  6. Acceptability

    Money is accepted because others accept it. That is the network effect itself. A reputation as a permanent file store, open questions about responsibility for files stored on chain, and rising costs due to non-monetary use, give some people reasons not to accept, hold or support the Bitcoin network.

  7. Immutability through decentralization

    This is the newest property on the list. It could only be recognized once Bitcoin's technology made it possible. Immutability through decentralization means that no one can rewrite Bitcoin's history because no one controls enough of the network to do it. That is protected by many independent people being able to verify the whole chain. Gold comes closest to being decentralized: no one controls it, but mining keeps adding to its mutable supply, and because it is less portable, it tends to end up in vaults and central banks. For Bitcoin, the risk falls on the verifiers themselves. Permanent non-monetary data on chain adds to what each of them must check, and those costs fall hardest on the smallest operators. Each operator priced out leaves the network more centralized, and its history easier to rewrite.

File Sharing Networks Are Useful For Data

Money isn't the only thing that emerges from a network. File sharing networks such as BitTorrent, IPFS, Filecoin and Arweave are built around a different set of properties. Here are eight network properties that make a network good at sharing files. Most of them pull in the opposite direction from the properties of money, which is why storing data in Bitcoin diverges from its role as money.

  1. Durability

    Files survive over time because enough copies exist somewhere. Durability is never free: every copy has to be stored, powered and moved to new hardware for as long as the file exists, so its cost keeps growing with time. File networks handle this by charging for ongoing storage or letting operators choose what to keep. Too many copies of the same file, on such a network, can be a cost multiplied through thousands of nodes, unless the network knows how to route one shared copy of a file to everyone.Shared with money, but money needs every node to keep one small ledger, not every file anyone chooses to add.

  2. Availability

    Anyone can fetch a file quickly, at any time. File networks spread popular files across many hosts so downloads stay fast.Money only needs recent transactions to move quickly. Its older history only has to stay verifiable.

  3. Capacity

    The network can hold more and more data as demand grows.The opposite of what money needs. The ledger has to stay small enough for ordinary people to verify on their own.

  4. Low cost per byte

    Storing and sharing a file should be cheap. That holds only in the short term. The cost of durability grows every year a file is kept, so a low price to store it today isn't a low cost over the file's life.In money, the cost of adding data is what keeps the ledger small.

  5. Selective hosting

    Each operator decides which files to store and share. A BitTorrent user seeds only what they choose, and an IPFS node keeps long term only what it pins. A smart file sharing network does not force an entire class of users to share copies of files they did not create, or don't want to share.Money works the opposite way. Every node must accept every valid block, so no node can turn down a file inside one.

  6. Deletability

    Files can be removed for legal, safety or personal reasons.Money needs the opposite: immutability, so that no record can be removed or changed.

  7. Access control

    Owners decide who can read a file, often by encrypting it or limiting who can fetch it. A file network with no access control offers little that a public website doesn't already, so access control is a core reason to use one.Bitcoin has none. Data written to it can be read by anyone who downloads the chain, and nobody can later restrict who reads it.

  8. Integrity

    You get exactly the file you asked for, unaltered. File networks do this by naming each file after a hash of its contents.Shared with money. Bitcoin's hashing makes any change to its history detectable.

Only durability and integrity overlap, and even those work differently. The rest are opposites: rules that would make Bitcoin a better file network would make it a worse money.

When uses diverge, new properties emerge

The last two sections described two sets of properties. Monetary properties emerge when people use Bitcoin as money. File sharing properties are what a network needs to be good for data. Both pull on the same rules. When Bitcoin is used for data, the rules get pulled toward the second list, and properties emerge that money never needed. That's what this page means by divergent uses.

File sharing isn't the only non-monetary use. Tokens, collectibles and non-monetary contracts pull in their own directions too. Here are five (of many) divergent properties. Each entry names the property, where it comes from, and the monetary properties it pushes against. Four have already emerged. The fifth would follow if covenants were adopted.

A permanent public file store

Comes from: File sharing's need for durability, without selective hosting, deletability or access control

Pushes against: Acceptability

Once Bitcoin is known as a place where any file can be stored forever, the people who run nodes take on the responsibilities of a file host, without having agreed to them. Blocks are checked and passed on whole, so a node can't drop one file and keep the rest, and there is no way to un-share a file later. Even a pruned node downloads and passes on the newest blocks, whatever they contain. These responsibilities have nothing to do with money, but they shape whether people choose to run, hold or accept Bitcoin.

Collectible coins

Comes from: Inscription and token protocols that treat satoshis as items, not money

Pushes against: Fungibility and divisibility

When individual satoshis are numbered and traded as collectibles, some coins become worth more than others of the same amount. Money depends on every unit being worth the same as any other. A collectible satoshi also has to travel with other sats in the same output, and wallets usually freeze that whole output rather than risk spending the collectible by mistake. Those extra sats can no longer be split off and spent as money.

Income that depends on data

Comes from: Demand for capacity and low cost per byte turned into revenue

Pushes against: Fungibility and divisibility, through centralization

Miners, marketplaces and services that earn from non-monetary demand have a reason to oppose rules that favour monetary use. Every fee a pool earns from inscriptions and runes is revenue that a spam-limiting rule would take away. Paid submission services (a.k.a. super relays) add to that income by delivering transactions straight to miners that most nodes' relay policy would filter. Most of this income goes to the largest pools, which pushes mining toward centralization. It is a divergent network effect of its own: it grows with non-monetary demand, and it helps keep in place the rules that weaken fungibility and divisibility, two of the ways a money scales.

Costs set by speculation

Comes from: Token launches and collectible mints

Pushes against: Portability and divisibility

Token launches and collectible mints come in waves. During a wave, the fee to move money is set partly by speculative demand that has nothing to do with payments. Higher fees make bitcoin more expensive to move, and they raise the smallest amount worth sending.

Contracts that need intermediaries

Comes from: Non-monetary contracts

Pushes against: Portability, fungibility and acceptability, through centralization

Covenants are a proposed kind of contract that limits how a coin can be spent in future. If they were introduced, most people would likely use them through third-party services, because building and checking such contracts is too complex for the average user. Contracts that tie coins to conditions, such as insurance arrangements, make those coins harder to move or exchange. Coins held under conditions stop being interchangeable with coins that have none. Depending on intermediaries also brings back the trust that Bitcoin as money removes.

Every example follows the same pattern: a non-monetary use pulls the rules toward what it needs, and a property of money gives way.

Spam doesn't have to break Bitcoin to hurt it. It only has to grow properties that make Bitcoin a little less useful as money, until people choose something else.

Paying for space doesn't make a use monetary

A common view is that the fee market alone should decide what enters a block: if a transaction pays, it belongs. Bitcoin has never worked that way.

Consensus rules reject transactions that break them, whatever fee they offer. Relay policy has long declined to pass on transactions that are valid but non-standard. Outputs too small to be worth spending have been non-standard since 2013. Each of these puts something other than price in charge of what gets in.

Fees decide the order of transactions the rules allow. The rules decide what is allowed. Whether Bitcoin's rules should favour its use as money is a question fees can't answer, because it's a question about the rules themselves.

Paying for block space does not make a transaction's purpose monetary.

How data currently gets in

Non-monetary data enters Bitcoin in at least nine ways. They differ in how much data fits, what it costs and how much harm it does. Each exists because of what the rules allow, and each can be resisted, though not always stopped, by node settings or consensus rules.

Two terms recur in the table. Full price means every byte counts in full toward the transaction's fee, and 75% discount means the data sits in the witness, where a byte counts for a quarter as much (see the example below). The set of unspent coins is the list of coins every node must keep at hand to check new payments, so data stuck there is the most costly kind.

MethodHow it worksWhat the rules allowPrice per byteProperties affectedWhat can resist it
OP_RETURN outputs Data goes in an output marked provably unspendable. Runes, Omni and Counterparty use this route. Bitcoin Core relayed one output of up to 83 bytes per transaction until version 30 (October 2025) raised the limit to 100,000 bytes and allowed several outputs. Knots relays 42 bytes by default. The data stays out of the set of unspent coins, so nodes can prune it. Full price Durability, because chain growth pushes more node runners to prune, which leaves fewer full copies of the history. Fungibility, when a token protocol such as Runes uses it. Policy: -datacarriersize, -datacarrier=0, Knots -rejecttokens (for Runes). Consensus: a cap on the size of new outputs.
Witness envelopes Data is wrapped in a never-executed OP_FALSE OP_IF … OP_ENDIF block inside a Taproot script. Inscriptions and BRC-20 tokens use this route. Up to about 400 KB in a transaction relayed by default, and nearly 4 MB if a miner includes it directly. 75% discount Fungibility, durability & immutability through decentralization Policy: Knots -datacarrierfullcount, which counts envelope data against -datacarriersize, and -maxscriptsize. Consensus: a cap on data push size, or a ban on conditional branches in Taproot scripts.
Fake multisig keys Data is disguised as public keys in bare multisig outputs that can never be spent, as with classic Stamps. Each output holds under 100 bytes, but a transaction can have many. The data stays in the set of unspent coins that every node holds, permanently. Relayed by default in Core, not in Knots. Full price Durability & immutability through decentralization Policy: -permitbaremultisig=0 (the Knots default). Consensus: a cap on the size of new outputs.
Fake ordinary outputs Data is split across outputs that look like normal 32-byte script hashes or keys, as with the newer OLGA format used by Stamps. The outputs can never be spent. Up to about 65 KB per transaction. The data stays in the set of unspent coins permanently, and each output looks like a normal payment. Full price Durability & immutability through decentralization Policy: Knots -rejecttokens detects the OLGA pattern. Consensus: hard to target, because the outputs look like ordinary ones and fit any output size cap.
P2WSH witness scripts Data is placed in the witness script of a SegWit version 0 spend. Up to 3,600 bytes per input under default relay policy. 75% discount Durability Policy: Knots -maxscriptsize. Consensus: a cap on data push size.
Legacy input scripts Data is placed in the unlocking script (scriptSig) of an older-style input. Up to 1,650 bytes per input under default relay policy. Full price Durability Policy: Knots -datacarrierfullcount applies its data limits beyond OP_RETURN. Consensus: a cap on data push size.
Large Taproot control blocks Data is hidden in the proof that a script belongs to a Taproot script tree. Up to about 4 KB per input. 75% discount Durability Policy: no common setting. Consensus: a cap on control block size.
Upgrade hooks The Taproot annex, unknown witness versions and reserved OP_SUCCESS opcodes exist for future upgrades, and can carry data. Valid under consensus, up to the block limit, but not relayed by default. A miner can still include them directly. 75% discount Durability Policy: already non-standard in Core and Knots. Consensus: make them invalid until an upgrade needs them.
Steganography Data is hidden in normal-looking fields such as signatures, keys, amounts and lock times. A few bytes per transaction. Relayed like any payment. Same as a payment Negligible Nothing can detect it, but the amounts are too small to matter.

Settings that resist use as data

Node software offers settings that decline to relay or mine some of these methods. They only affect your own node, and they're bypassed when transactions are sent straight to miners. They raise the cost and narrow the path, but they don't bind blocks. Defaults shown are for Bitcoin Core 30 and Bitcoin Knots 29.1.

SettingSoftwareWhat it resistsDefault
-datacarriersizeCore and KnotsLarge OP_RETURN outputsCore: 100,000 bytes. Knots: 42 bytes
-datacarrier=0Core and KnotsAll OP_RETURN outputsAllowed
-permitbaremultisig=0Core and KnotsFake multisig keysCore: allowed. Knots: blocked
-rejectparasitesKnotsOverlay protocols it can detect, currently CAT-21On
-rejecttokensKnotsToken protocols it can detect, currently Runes and OLGA StampsOff
-datacarriercostKnotsCheap data, by counting data bytes as heavier when ranking transactions1.0 (no extra weight)
-datacarrierfullcountKnotsData outside OP_RETURN, such as inscription envelopes, by applying -datacarriersize to itOn
-maxscriptsizeKnotsLarge scripts and witness stacks1,650 bytes
-dustrelayfeeCore and KnotsTiny outputs that bloat the set of unspent coins3 sat/vB

Consensus limits that have been proposed

Consensus rules are the only layer that binds every block, however a transaction arrives. The most complete set of limits proposed so far is BIP-110, the Reduced Data Temporary Softfork. It has seven rules, and each one answers a method in the table above.

  1. New outputs are capped at 34 bytes, or 83 bytes for OP_RETURN. This ends large OP_RETURN outputs and fake multisig keys.
  2. Data pushes and witness items are capped at 256 bytes. This limits witness envelopes, P2WSH witness scripts and legacy input scripts, which today carry data in larger pieces.
  3. Spending an undefined witness version is invalid. This closes the first upgrade hook.
  4. The Taproot annex is invalid. This closes the second.
  5. Taproot control blocks are capped at 257 bytes, down from about 4 KB.
  6. Reserved OP_SUCCESS opcodes are invalid in Taproot scripts. This closes the third upgrade hook.
  7. Taproot scripts can't run OP_IF or OP_NOTIF. This ends the OP_FALSE OP_IF envelope that inscriptions use.

The proposal had two safeguards. It was temporary: the rules would expire about a year after they activated, so a mistake would correct itself. And coins that existed before activation were exempt, so no existing coin could be frozen by the new rules.

It also names its own costs. The control block cap could hold back contract designs that need very large script trees, such as BitVM. The upgrade hooks can't be used by any other soft fork while the rules are active. And some wallet software produces Taproot scripts containing OP_IF, which would have to change.

BIP-110 asked for 55% of blocks to signal support, far below the usual 95%, and made signalling mandatory in a final window before lock-in. It didn't get that support. The proposal was marked closed in August 2026, after a chain split in which the minority chain stalled.

Bitcoin Knots did not drop the rules. Its 29.4.1 release in September 2026 is a hard fork. It replaces SHA-256 proof of work with BLAKE2b, switches on all seven rules at the fork without waiting for miners to signal, and adds a temporary block limit of 800,000 weight units, a fifth of the usual four million. Those rules bind only the chain that Knots 29.4.1 and later follow, where they are set to expire in September 2027. Nodes running Bitcoin Core follow the original chain, where none of them apply. Whether that counts as adopting the rules or as leaving Bitcoin is itself disputed.

Even these rules leave gaps. Data can still be split into 256-byte pieces at a higher cost, and fake outputs that look like ordinary ones fit inside the 34-byte cap, so they are hard to target.

No single setting or rule stops every method, but each layer raises the cost of using Bitcoin for data.

Example: Rules set the price of data

SegWit (BIP 141) counts witness bytes at a quarter of the weight of other bytes. The discount was designed so that spending coins would cost less than creating new ones, which keeps the set of unspent coins small. Taproot's script rules (BIP 342) removed the old limit on script size. Together, those two rules made the witness the cheapest place to store large files. Move the sliders to see the difference.

A simplified estimate that ignores the small transaction overhead. Data in an OP_RETURN costs 1 vbyte per byte. Data in a witness costs a quarter of a vbyte per byte.

Paying full price
As an inscription

Where the choices are made

Spam results from the choices that protocol rules allow. Also, the cost of Proof Of Work guides those choices to their end, whether the choices are monetary or data prone. Those choices happen at four levels, and they aren't equally powerful. Being honest about which ones work is part of making the case.

Everyone, through consensus

Protocol rules

Can: bind every block, no matter how a transaction reached the miner. Rules set what data costs and how much of it a transaction can carry.

Can't: change without broad agreement from the people and businesses that run nodes and hold bitcoin. BIP-110 failed because it didn't have that agreement from centralized economic nodes, who were backed by proof of work power.

Protects: all seven monetary properties

Miners and pools

Block templates

Can: decline to include transactions. Protocols like DATUM, used by the OCEAN pool, let individual miners build their own templates with their own policies.

Can't: keep data out while other miners include it. As long as the rules reward it, some miners will take the fees.

Protects: portability, divisibility

Node runners

Relay policy

Can: decline to pass on transactions and show which policy users prefer. Bitcoin Knots offers filters for common data patterns.

Can't: stop transactions sent straight to miners or through relay services that accept them. Relay policy alone doesn't keep spam out of blocks.

Protects: a signal, not a guarantee

Wallets, exchanges and users

Demand

Can: decline to build, list or promote non-monetary schemes, which reduces the market that pays for them.

Can't: remove the incentive while the rules still make data storage cheap.

Protects: acceptability, fungibility

That's why this page focuses on the emergent properties of money and the rules that shape them. Miner and relay choices help at the margins, but the lasting fix is a consensus-driven rule change with broad support. Broad support comes from making the monetary case clearly enough that people who run nodes, hold bitcoin and mine blocks agree with it.

Rules have changed before

Bitcoin has two kinds of rules. Consensus rules decide which blocks are valid, and every node enforces them on every block. Node policy decides what a node relays and what a miner puts in its block template by default. It can differ from node to node and doesn't bind blocks. Most entries below are one or the other, and each changed behaviour. Some moved Bitcoin toward its role as money. Others opened doors nobody intended. Two entries aren't rule changes at all, but new uses that followed from earlier ones.

YearWhat changedType of change
2010Satoshi adds a 1 MB block size limit. It is widely understood as a guard against spam and denial-of-service attacks. SegWit later replaces it with a weight limit.Consensus
2013Bitcoin Core 0.8.2 makes "dust" outputs, too small to be worth spending, non-standard.Node policy
2014Bitcoin Core 0.9 makes small OP_RETURN outputs standard. The aim is to give data a prunable place that stays out of the set of unspent coins. The limit later settles at 80 bytes of data.Node policy
2017SegWit activates and counts witness data at a quarter of the weight of other data.Consensus
2021Taproot activates, and its script rules remove the old script size limit.Consensus
2023Ordinals inscriptions combine those two changes to store large files cheaply. In February a single inscription takes up 3.96 MB of block 774,628.New use, no rule change
2024Runes tokens launch at the April halving, using OP_RETURN outputs.New use, no rule change
2025Bitcoin Core 30 raises its default OP_RETURN relay limit from 83 bytes to 100,000 bytes.Node policy
2026BIP-110, a temporary soft fork to limit data, fails. About 2.5% of blocks signal for it against a 55% threshold, and the minority chain stalls after two blocks.Consensus (proposed)

BIP-110 didn't show that spam could be stopped. It showed that one design to reduce spam, at one moment, didn't win enough agreement. Rules that move Bitcoin toward money have been adopted before, and rules that moved it away were adopted too. Which way the rules move next depends on which argument persuades more people.

The strongest objections, answered

These are the arguments most often raised against changing the rules, with a response to each.

"Filters don't work. Spammers just go straight to miners."For relay filters on their own, that's largely right.

Transactions can be sent directly to miners, and some relay services accept what filtering nodes refuse. That's why this page doesn't rest its case on filters. Consensus rules apply to every block, however a transaction arrived.

"Fee demand should be the only thing that decides what goes in a block."It never has been.

Consensus rules, standardness and dust limits have always excluded transactions that were willing to pay. Fees rank what the rules allow. They were never meant to decide what the rules should be. See paying for space doesn't make a use monetary.

"Miners like higher fees. Spam pays them more."True today, and worth taking seriously.

Miners are paid in bitcoin, and the value of what they're paid rests on Bitcoin's use as money. Fee income from uses that weaken the monetary properties is a trade-off, not a free gain. Each miner has to weigh short-term fees against the long-term value of the coins they earn.

"I don't care what goes in the blocks. I care about earning the fee, not what the block contains."The fee and the data aren't separate.

The fee is paid in bitcoin, and what that bitcoin is worth rests on its use as money. If the data in a block weakens the properties that make Bitcoin money, some of the fee's value goes with them. The data also doesn't go away once the fee is collected. Every node downloads, verifies and passes it on, whatever it contains, and the chain keeps it permanently. Caring only about the fee is still a choice, and under the current rules it's a choice that rewards non-monetary use.

"If you block one method, they'll hide data somewhere worse."Rules still set the price of every method.

No rule can stop every way of disguising data. But methods differ in cost. Fake-key methods pay full price per byte, four times what the witness costs. The aim isn't zero. It's to stop the rules from making non-monetary data cheaper than monetary use, and to address worse methods as they appear, as past rule changes did.

"Who decides what counts as spam?"The same process that decides every other rule.

Bitcoin's rules already draw lines around valid transactions, standard scripts and dust. Any new line goes through the same open process of proposal, review and adoption as every earlier one.

"Changing the rules to restrict data is censorship."A rule that applies equally to everyone isn't censorship.

Censorship resistance in Bitcoin means no one can stop a valid transaction from being confirmed. Immutability means no one can reverse or change it once it's final. Both protect transactions that follow the rules. Neither has ever promised that the rules themselves can't change.

Censorship singles out particular people or payments. A consensus rule applies the same way to every transaction and is adopted in the open. Bitcoin has changed its rules this way many times, including the changes that made data storage cheap in the first place.

"BIP-110 failed, so the debate is over."One proposal failed. The question didn't go away.

BIP-110 lacked support from miners and major economic nodes. That tells us what a successful change needs: a clear case and broad agreement. It doesn't tell us that rules favouring monetary use can never be adopted.

What a good proposal looks like

The objections above point to what a rule change needs in order to win. BIP-110 shows that a good idea isn't enough. Seven tests, drawn from what this page has argued, separate a proposal that can earn broad agreement from one that can't. The first two are about what the rule does for money. The rest are about how it wins agreement.

  1. It names the monetary property it protects

    A proposal should say which of the seven monetary properties it defends, and how. "This data is spam" is an opinion that people can reject. "This rule lowers what it costs to verify the chain" is a claim that people can check. Arguing from the properties keeps the debate on money, and away from what anyone thinks of the content.

  2. It costs monetary users nothing

    No coin that exists today should become harder to spend. Ordinary payments, multisig wallets and Lightning channels should work exactly as before. Critics will look for one frozen coin or one broken wallet, so the proposal has to show there are none, or name the few cases and say why they are acceptable.

  3. It is narrow

    It changes one thing. No single rule stops every method, so a proposal that promises to is easy to reject. A narrow rule is easier to review, test and explain, and nobody can reject it over a part they dislike. Narrow rules do invite one objection: that data will just move to another method. The answer is to choose a rule whose fallback costs more, such as closing a discounted method so that what remains pays full price.

  4. It targets the biggest harms first

    Methods differ in how much data they carry, what they cost and how much damage they do to the monetary properties. Start with the ones that do the most harm, and say by how much the rule raises their cost per byte, so the claim can be checked. Address worse methods as they appear, as past rule changes did.

  5. It accounts for who loses income

    Some miners, marketplaces and services earn from data today, and they will resist. A proposal should say who loses revenue and roughly how much. It should also make the case that they gain more from bitcoin's value as money than they lose in data fees. A proposal that ignores this meets its opposition for the first time at activation.

  6. It shows support before it activates

    Everyone who must agree, from the people who run nodes to the miners and businesses, can see how the change would switch on, what threshold it needs and what happens to anyone who doesn't upgrade. That support should be visible before activation begins. A low threshold or forced signalling doesn't create agreement. It turns the disagreement into a chain split.

  7. It can be reversed

    A consensus change needs a plan for undoing it by consensus, whether that is an expiry date or a way to switch it off, if it causes harm nobody foresaw. The plan is part of the proposal from the start. Knowing that a mistake can be corrected makes it easier to agree to the change.

How BIP-110 scores

Scoring the proposal that failed shows which tests matter most. The details are in the consensus limits above.

TestResultWhy
Names the monetary propertyMostlyIt argued from the cost of running a node, decentralization and the cost of payments, though not rule by rule.
Costs monetary users nothingMostlyCoins that existed before activation were exempt. It admitted costs to large script trees such as BitVM and to some wallet scripts.
NarrowNoSeven rules in one package, so an objection to any one of them counted against all.
Biggest harms firstPartlyIt covered the largest methods, but small and little-used ones too.
Accounts for who loses incomeNoIt showed that miners collect the fee while node runners carry the cost, but gave miners no reason to give the fee up.
Shows support before it activatesNoIt set a 55% threshold with forced signalling. About 2.5% of blocks signalled, and the chain split.
Can be reversedYesThe rules expired after a year.

BIP-110 did best on the tests about what a rule does for money, and worst on the tests about winning agreement. The next proposal has to pass both kinds.

What you can do

Money is emergent. It exists because many people make the same choice, so your choices count.

  1. Run your own node

    Your node enforces the rules you choose. Rule changes succeed when enough of the people and businesses who use Bitcoin run nodes that enforce them.

  2. Learn how rules set incentives

    Read BIP 141 and BIP 342, and use the calculator above. Knowing why data is cheap is the first step to arguing that it shouldn't be.

  3. Make the monetary case

    In discussions, show with evidence how a particular use affects Bitcoin's monetary properties. Argue the ideas, not the people.

  4. Take part in review

    Read, test and comment on proposals on the mailing list and in pull requests. Specific feedback moves proposals further than outrage does.

  5. Put your business where your view is

    Choose wallets, exchanges and pools whose policies match the use of Bitcoin you want to support.

Read further

Check these primary sources yourself and form your own view.